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proposition that export volume becomes enhanced as more productivity-enhancing 
innovation is captured by the exporting economy is the focus of this study. From a 
Schumpeterian perspective, innovation can be characterized by continuous creation 
and subsequent diffusion of newer technologies on the basis of the exporters’ existing 
capital stock. Then we highlight the theoretical possibility that concentration of 
innovative activities in a small group of “winner” economies would lead to larger 
shares of “winner” economies’ exports of innovation-active commodities than those 
commodities for which technology involved is already mature. The world’s export data 
corroborates this theoretical prediction overall, and a focus upon East Asia has 
revealed the region’s increasing resort to technology-intensive commodity sectors, 
which has presumably been enabled through attracting technology-bearing inward 
foreign direct investment. Considering the overall gains from innovation, acceleration 
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1. The Role of Knowledge in Industrialization 
The critical role of knowledge in development through industrialization is 
pronounced in recent years (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi et al. 1988; Grossman and 
Helpman 1991). There may be incidences in which a country benefits from having 
superior technology, whereas there may also be instances in which multiple competitive 
advantages stand to gain by increased exports. The underlying concept here is the 
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existence of a three-stage sequence of value1-creation, starting from (1) knowledge 
creation, then (2) embodiment of the knowledge in manufactured products, and finally, 
(3) exports of those products for foreign sale. It is up to the economy which of these 
three aspects to focus upon. The recent trend in “selection and specialization” 
industrialization strategy can be regarded as an attempt to reap economic rents a la 
Schumpeter (1961), depending on the economy’s self-perception of where its 
competitive advantage resides. 
With an “evolutionary” view in mind, this paper addresses innovation process 
with a particular focus on its possibility of concentration among existing innovators. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature of innovation from a 
disequilibrium viewpoint. Then Section 3 undertakes a simulation analysis of 
innovation concentration. Section 4 attempts to empirically substantiate the implication 
of the previous section, with an emphasis upon East Asia. Section 5 concludes this 
paper and provides prospects for future research. 
 
2. “Disequilibrium view” of innovation 
The previous section has briefly investigated the nature of knowledge creation in the 
context of export-led economic development. This section reviews the role of 
technological knowledge in the economic process, and then attempts to associate the 
argument with international trade. Otani (2003) propounds the concept of “globalization 
cycle” within the empirical context of economic globalization and also under the 
theoretical purview of evolutionary theory. According to Otani, the dynamic aspect of 
                                                  
1 Schumpeter (1961: 66) enumerates the following five cases as “development” alias “innovation”: 
(1)the introduction of a new good—that is one with which consumers are not yet familiar— or of a 
new quality of a good; 
(2) the introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by experience in the 
branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means be founded upon a discovery 
scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling a commodity commercially; 
(3) the opening of a new market, that is a market into which the particular branch of manufacture of 
the country in question has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed before; 
(4) the conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, again 
irrespective of whether this source already exists or whether it has first to be created; 
(5) the carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like the creation of a monopoly position 
or the breaking up of a monopoly position. 
In a broad sense, therefore, the value-creation through cheap labor utilization can be seen as 
“rent-creation”, since not only industrial invention but also, such extensive utilization of cheap labor 
can be seen as innovation. 
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economic globalization can be schematically presented as in Figure 1:  
“In a dynamic real economy, firms engage in continuous struggle to innovate newer goods 
and newer technologies to gain pronounced competitive advantages. Through the diffusion of 
knowledge, these innovations will stimulate other firms to catch up and the competitive 
advantage of the original innovator will dissipate. […] This dissipation of the older 
competitive advantages will push firms to further innovations to regain a newer competitive 
advantage. […] Therefore globalization can be divided up into the process of convergence 
and that of creative innovations through intensified international competition (Otani, 2003: 
126). 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Otani (2003), Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Globalization Cycle 
 
 This dynamic or “evolutionary” view of globalization is not only in line with 
Schumpeterian creative destructions but also Aoki and Yoshikawa’s (1999) “growth 
cum incessant innovation”. An empirical illustration of Figure 2 would be: demand for 
“tele”-communication (to mean communication “from a distance”) lead an 
entrepreneurial firm to create at time t1 the innovation (or invention) of telegraph; as the 
demand for telegraph saturates and competitive pressure pushes down the price, the 
economic rent for manufacturing telegraphs dissipates; then the firm strives for creating 
a newer product, culminating at time t2 in the innovation (invention) of radio; then at 
time t3, by the same token, the emergence of “tele”-vision follows. The same line of 
argument can be made for almost all the other industrial products.2 
While empirical anecdotes abound with respect to innovation, the mainstream 
branch of economics tends to stay away from this important phenomenon. The next 
                                                  
2 The births of semiconductors, personal computers, cellular phones and internet services are just a 
few such examples. 
Competitive Pressure & 
Innovation 
Technological 
diffusion 
Technological 
convergence 
Technological 
diversity 
 4
section makes a theoretical investigation into how this sort of technological innovation 
can be captured from an evolutionary perspective. 
 
 
 
3. Theoretical analysis of innovation 
3.1 Overall feature of the model for simulation 
Our simulation model is heavily dependent on Nelson and Winter (1982, ch. 12). In the 
present model, we introduce the Schumpeterian competition of innovation. The model 
does not focus on equilibrium analysis. Firms' profits remain in each firm for 
tomorrow's R&D expenses and investments, there are winners and losers, and the 
process of competition is one of continuing disequilibrium. In this section we focus on 
technological progress: How firms survive competition of innovation, how firms 
obtain advanced technology through innovation and imitation, what kind of market 
structure is obtained, etc. As the result, we show how the rank-size relationship is 
obtained. 
Moreover, we test two hypotheses: (1) The more aggressively R&D activities 
and innovation are done, the steeper the slope of the rank-size linear relationship 
becomes, (2) Besides aggressive R&D activities and innovation, the less technological 
diffusion there is (i.e., there exists less technological spillovers or more stringent 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection), the steeper the slope of the rank-size 
linear relationship becomes. The first hypothesis shows that the virtuous circle of 
Ceiling of demand 
Demand 
t1 t2 t3 0 
Demand for the new product 
created at time 0 
・ ・ ・ ・ ・ 
Time 
Demand for the new product 
created at time t3 
Note: ti refers to the time at which a new product/industry emerged  
Source: Adapted from Aoki and Yoshikawa (1999). 
Figure 2. Divergence and Convergence of Newer Technologies 
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innovation continues for the group of winners along with accumulated capitals as a 
main source of innovation activities in the present model, whereas the vicious circle of 
(unsuccessful) innovation continues for the group of losers along with small 
accumulated capitals. As a result, the slope of the rank-size linear relationship becomes 
steeper. As for the second hypothesis, we can observe effects of technological diffusion. 
Success of imitation is dependent on technological spillovers or the degree of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection. If the firms cannot imitate advanced 
technology, they cannot catch up with the group of winners and the firms become 
losers eventually. 
 
3.2 The Model 
Firms in a country compete in a single-homogeneous-good exporting market3. The 
good is produced by a single primary input, capital. A production function is, 
 
ititit KAQ =                                                   (1) 
 
where itQ  denotes outputs of firm i , itA  technology of firm i , itK  capital stocks 
of firm i , respectively. Subscripts t  denote time. The firms do not have market 
power: They are price-takers. Initially, the firms are symmetric but, as we introduce the 
Schumpeterian R&D competition, the firms become different each other in terms of 
their technology and capital stocks in the long run. 
The Cobb-Douglass utility function is implicitly assumed to formulate a 
representative household's preference. After solving a normal maximization problem, 
we obtain a well-known hyperbolic (inverse) demand function; 
 
tt QYP /μ=                                                   (2) 
 
where tP  denotes the price of the homogeneous good, μ  the share of payments, Y  
the income of the households, )(
1∑== ni itt QQ  the total outputs of n  firms, 
respectively. 
The profit function for firm i  is defined as follows: 
 
                                                  
3 We ignore the domestic market for simplicity. We can also take account of foreign firms into this 
market competition as long as we concentrate on an analysis of an export market such as the third 
market. However, in order to keep the discussion consistent with the other sections of this paper, we 
focus only on the export market competition of domestic firms. 
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itiminittit KrrcQP )( ++−=Π                                     (3) 
 
where c  denotes marginal costs for production, inr  marginal innovative R&D costs, 
imr  marginal imitative R&D costs, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that 
marginal costs, innovative R&D costs and imitative R&D costs are common across all 
the firms and are not dependent on time. We further assume that the firms expend both 
innovative and imitative R&D costs in every period4 and the expenses for the R&D 
activities are proportional to capital stocks of each firm, i.e., the more capital stocks a 
firm has, the more amount of the costs it expends. The firms expend the both R&D 
costs even though they earn negative profits. 
Success or failure of innovation and/or imitation follows a random process. 
Let us define two independent random variables, intd , the probability of success of 
innovation, and imtd , the probability of success of imitation. The variables have two 
discrete numbers, one or zero, namely, success in getting an innovation or an imitation 
draw, or failure. We can rewrite such draws as follows: 
 
itinn Krad == )1Pr( int                                            (4) 
 
itimmimt Krad == )1Pr(                                           (5) 
 
where na  and ma  are parameters in order not to encounter the upper-bound 
probability of one. If a firm gets a draw of success in innovation, it picks up 
technology from a distribution of technological opportunities, ),;( 0iAtAF , which is 
dependent on time and the initial value of itA . If a firm gets a draw of success in 
imitation, it copies the highest (best practice) productivity level. 
If a firm picks up both an imitation draw and an innovation draw, the 
production technology of the following period is 
 
)ˆ,~,max()1( tititti AAAA =+  
 
where itA
~  denotes a random variable that is the result of the innovation draw and tAˆ  
                                                  
4 In the simulation analysis of Nelson and Winter (1982, ch. 12, p. 289), it is assumed that the first 
half of the firms expend both types of R&D costs and the latter half expend only imitative costs. 
However, in this paper we do not take account of this assumption in order to pay attention to 
resulting outcomes which are obtained under competition of identical firms at first. 
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the highest productivity level in the industry in period t . If a firm fails to obtain an 
innovation draw, 0~ =itA . If it fails to obtain an imitation draw, 0ˆ =tA . If a firm fails 
to obtain both an innovation draw and an imitation draw, its productivity level of 
period 1+t  remains the same as period t . 
As for investments, they are determined by the following investment function: 
 
}} } }
itit
t
ittt
it KQ
Q
c
AP
I
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
Π≡
++
−+
)()(
)()(
,,, δι                                       (6) 
 
where cAP tt /  denotes the percentage margin over cost, tit QQ /  the market share, 
itΠ  the profits, δ  the depreciation rate, respectively. Positive and negative signs 
denote the signs of partial derivatives of itI  with respect to each argument. Following 
the mechanism (6), itI  (resulting amount of investments) is added to itK  and )1( +tiK  
is obtained. 
 
3.3 The Specification of the model for simulations 
Following the model in the preceding section, we specify the exogenous variables and 
the formulae of the model. The specifications of the exogenous variables are as 
follows: 67=Yμ , 16.0=c , 03.0=δ , 16.00 =tA . n  (the number of the firms) 
can be determined arbitrarily. 3/20 *783.2421901.11
−+−= nK  where ∑ == ni iKK 1 00 , 
125.0=na , 25.1=ma , 80 =Knrin , 4.00 =Knrim . itA~  has the log-normal 
distribution )),(( 2σλ tN  where ασ *05.0=  and tt **01.016.0)( βλ += . (α  and 
β  are shift parameters for numerical simulations.) All the random variables are 
generated by Mathematica. 
Taking account of the above, the specifications of the formulae are as follows: 
 
(The demand function) 
 
t
t Q
P 67= . 
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(The profit function) 
 
itiminittit KrrQP )16.0( ++−=Π . 
 
In our analysis, we use the following definition to keep simulations consistent with 
Nelson and Winter (1982, ch. 12): 
 
ititit K/
~ Π=Π .  (profits per unit of capital) 
 
(The probability in getting an innovation draw) 
 
),exp(
!
)(
int
int
int ηη −=
d
df
d
 (the Poisson distribution) 
 
where itinn Kra=η  (the variance and the mean of the above distribution). 
 
(The probability in getting an imitation draw) 
 
)),(exp(
!
)()( γξγξ −=
imt
d
imt d
dg
imt
 (the Poisson distribution) 
 
where itimm Kra=ξ  (the variance and the mean of the above distribution). γ  is a 
shift parameter for numerical simulations. We assume that γ  shows the degree of 
technological spillovers or the stringency of IPRs protection. The change of γ  
directly affects the variance and the mean of the Poisson distribution function of 
imitation. The larger γ , the easier to imitate. 
 
(The distribution of technological opportunities) 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−= 2
2
2
))(~(log
exp~2
1)~( σ
λ
σπ
tA
A
AN it
it
it , (the log-normal distribution)  (7) 
 
where ασ *05.0=  (the standard deviation) and tt **01.016.0)( βλ +=  (the 
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mean), as we have mentioned above. In our model (7) is a main source of innovation, 
as innovation occurs randomly after the firms get an innovation draw. In numerical 
simulations we vary α  and β  from 0.5 to 1.5 in order to observe effects of changes 
of the range of technology choices (σ ) and the accumulations of knowledge over time 
(λ ) on technological innovation. 
 
(The investment function) 
[ ] ,0))~(),,(min(,0max ≥Π= ititititit KhskI ρ  
where titit QQs /= , 16.0/ittit AP=ρ , ))22(/()2(03.1),( ititititit sssk −−−≡ ρρ , and 
),0~(~03.0
),0~(~03.0)~(
>ΠΠ+=
≤ΠΠ+=Π
itit
ititith
β  
where 1>β , an exogenous variable, denotes availability of bank credits. In our 
simulations we define 2=β , following the original setting. The firms can get bank 
credits even though their profits are negative, which can often be seen in reality. We 
assume that the firms with positive profits can get more bank credits than those with 
negative profits. 
),( ititsk ρ  has the following property: 0/),( <∂∂ ititit ssk ρ  and 
0lim 1 =→ its Iit . In Nelson and Winter (1982, ch. 12) it is assumed that the firms 
become reluctant to invest as their market shares get larger, based on the idea that the 
firms enjoying large market shares do not have to make the competition fiercer. 
However, in reality, firms may continue to invest almost eternally otherwise the time to 
exit from the market may come even towards current winners. Therefore, we introduce 
another type of the investment function: 
[ ] 0)~(,0max ≥Π= ititit KhJ . 
)~( ith Π  has the following property: 0~/)~( >Π∂Π∂ itith  and ∞=∞→Π itJit~lim . In this 
case the firms continue to invest even though they are the current winners. In 
numerical simulations we use only itJ  to formulate the investment function. 
 
3.4 Numerical Simulations 
We conduct numerical simulations for 20 firms ( 20=n ) and 160 periods. Containing 
random variables in our simulations, we took 100 samples per firm and computed the 
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mean of the accumulated capitals in the final period, applying a method a la Monte 
Carlo. Among many variables, we focus on accumulations of capital stocks as it is a 
key variable and a main source of both the R&D expenses and investments. To see the 
rank-size relationship, we show a sample plot in Figure 3. 
 
 
       Figure 3: A Sample Plot (α=β=0.5) 
 
The dots are the simulation results (a mean of 100 samples of accumulated capitals in 
the final period), the horizontal line shows the rank (the log of the ranking), the vertical 
line shows the size (the log of the size) and the solid line shows a regression line (by 
ordinary least squares). In the first hypothesis, the slope of the regression line becomes 
steeper as R&D activities and innovation are done more aggressively. In order to 
observe if this occurs, we vary the range of technology choices (σ ) and the 
accumulations of knowledge over time (λ ) by changing both α  and β  from 0.5 to 
1.5. 
The results (the slopes of the regression lines) are shown in Table 1. As we 
can see, the slope becomes (negatively) greater as α and β becomes greater. 
Intuitively, large σ  represents broad technology choices, namely, the technology of 
this industry is not mature yet, such as information and communication technology 
(ICT) industry. On the contrary, small σ  represents an industry which has mature 
technology such as agriculture or textile. As for the accumulations of knowledge over 
time (λ ), it obviously contributes to make the slope steeper.  
For the second hypothesis, we vary α  and γ  as well5. The results are 
shown in Table 2. It shows that the slope becomes steeper as γ  gets smaller and α  
gets larger. The change of α  brings the same effect as in the first hypothesis. The 
                                                  
5 We omit β  because effects of the change of β  on the results seems predictable. 
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change of γ  shows the effect of technological diffusion. If technological spillovers 
are large enough or the stringency of IPRs protection is weak enough, it becomes 
easier for the firms to imitate advanced technology and the slope becomes flatter. If 
technological spillovers are small enough or the stringency of IPRs protection is strong 
enough, the opposite occurs and the slope becomes steeper, as the winners keep on 
winning with advanced technology whereas the losers hardly catch up. 
 
Table 1. The Slopes of the Rank-Size Relationship with Varied α and β 
 
 
Table 2. The Slopes of the Rank-Size Relationship with Varied α and γ  
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4. Some empirical evidence 
4.1 World’s cross-sectional results and East Asia 
Following the argument so far, this sub-section makes an empirical analysis of export 
performance. The theory in the previous section leads to the hypothesis that in a 
particular industrial sector in which winners keep on innovating advanced technology 
with a disproportionately high frequency, the “rank-size” curve becomes steeper than 
otherwise. 
Empirical calculation has therefore been made in order to observe the validity 
of this hypothesis. We have used fob-based export data contained in the United 
Nations’ online database UNCOMTRADE and conducted the linear regression of the 
rank (horizontal axis)-size (vertical axis) distribution (both axes in logarithm) for each 
commodity sector across all the countries listed in the database. The sector 
classification we have drawn on is provided in the Appendix. For normalization 
purpose, rank 1 economy’s export volume (size) is set equal to 100 and all the other 
economies’ export volumes are indexed on this basis. 
Table 3 shows the results of our linear regression. As shown, the slope is 
steeper for apparently more technology-intensive commodity sectors including 
“Electrical”, “Machinery” and “Transportation”, and the slope is less steep for less 
technology-intensive commodities, i.e., “Agriculture”, “Food” and “Textiles”. This 
result seems to be in line with the theory-driven hypothesis above. 
Separate calculation has also revealed that the East Asia as a whole has been 
climbing up the ladder of world ranking in the two most technology-intensive sectors, 
i.e., “Electrical” and “Machinery” over the past two decades, as shown in Table 4. In a 
nutshell, it is said that East Asia on the whole has successfully been capturing 
technological innovation. The next sub-section touches upon East Asia’s recent 
performance in terms of the creation and utilization of industrial knowledge.
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Table 3. Linear-regression results of rank-size distribution for the world’s exports (across all 
countries) by commodity, 1976, 1985, 1995 and 2003 
Commodity 
sector 
Item 1976 1985 1995 2003 Simple 
average 
of slope
Electrical Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.3 (-17.29) 
3.44 (11.40) 
0.90 
35 
-3.56 (-16.63) 
4.34 (13.12) 
0.77 
82 
-3.81 (-24.05) 
5.04 (18.45) 
0.82 
126 
-3.83 (-20.77) 
5.31 (16.61) 
0.77 
129 
-3.88 
Machinery Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.28 (-15.27) 
3.63 (10.69) 
0.87 
36 
-3.54 (-1854) 
4.45 (15.00) 
0.81 
83 
-3.68 (-25.95) 
4.87 (19.90) 
0.84 
126 
-3.65 (-24.47) 
5.07 (19.56) 
0.82 
129 
-3.79 
Transportation Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.23 (-15.08) 
3.28 (9.56) 
0.86 
37 
-3.54 (-19.69) 
4.24 (15.25) 
0.83 
82 
-3.67 (-23.96) 
4.83 (18.27) 
0.82 
127 
-3.61 (-23.30) 
4.86 (18.12) 
0.81 
128 
-3.76 
Pottery Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.07 (-11.76) 
4.01 (9.39) 
0.79 
38 
-3.64 (-12.98) 
4.87 (11.14) 
0.67 
84 
-3.65 (-18.31) 
5.17 (14.97) 
0.73 
127 
-3.36 (-16.28) 
4.98 (13.90) 
0.67 
129 
-3.68 
Metal Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.44 (-11.02) 
3.91 (7.92) 
0.77 
37 
-3.14 (-13.53) 
4.35 (12.11) 
0.69 
82 
-3.52 (-17.77) 
5.13 (14.93) 
0.71 
128 
-3.30 (-17.00) 
4.97 (14.72) 
0.69 
130 
-3.60 
Chemical Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.11 (-11.68) 
3.86 (8.97) 
0.79 
37 
-3.03 (-14.95) 
4.16 (13.13) 
0.73 
85 
n.a. -3.57 (-16.82) 
5.18 (13.99) 
0.68 
131 
-3.57 
Wood and 
Paper 
Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.14 (-12.80) 
3.89 (9.67) 
0.81 
39 
-3.10 (-15.99) 
4.07 (13.47) 
0.75 
85 
-3.44 (-1925) 
4.85 (15.72) 
0.75 
126 
-3.33 (-16.42) 
4.91 (13.95) 
0.68 
129 
-3.50 
Others Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-3.96 (-13.99) 
3.71 (10.71) 
0.84 
37 
-3.16 (-15.81) 
4.38 (14.00) 
0.75 
85 
-3.10 (-20.30) 
4.45 (16.86) 
0.76 
128 
-3.14 (-18.59) 
4.65 (15.85) 
0.73 
130 
-3.34 
Mining Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-4.05 (-8.61) 
3.41 (5.83) 
0.66 
39 
-2.96 (-10.36) 
4.38 (9.84) 
0.56 
84 
-3.15 (-15.10) 
4.78 (13.20) 
0.64 
128 
-3.09 (-14.31) 
4.78 (12.75) 
0.61 
129 
-3.31 
Light Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-3.44 (-12.83) 
3.88 (11.53) 
0.81 
40 
-3.07 (-13.87) 
4.13 (11.96) 
0.69 
85 
-3.22 (-19.56) 
4.63 (16.25) 
0.75 
128 
-3.10 (-18.54) 
4.50 (15.55) 
0.73 
128 
-3.21 
Food Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-3.39 (-7.95) 
4.06 (7.72) 
0.63 
38 
-2.51 (-12.92) 
3.73 (12.23) 
0.66 
86 
-2.80 (-16.86) 
4.25 (14.78) 
0.69 
128 
-2.61 (-14.46) 
4.10 (13.07) 
0.62 
130 
-2.83 
Textiles Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-3.30 (-10.95) 
3.55 (9.56) 
0.76 
38 
-2.51 (-9.57) 
4.24 (10.34) 
0.52 
85 
-2.35 (-13.32) 
4.30 (14.05) 
0.58 
128 
-2.37 (-11.72) 
4.40 (12.50) 
0.51 
130 
-2.63 
Agriculture Slope  
Intercept 
Adj R squared 
No. of obs. 
-2.28 (-10.62) 
3.11 (11.57) 
0.51 
40 
-2.21 (-13.55) 
3.45 (13.38) 
0.67 
89 
-2.29 (-21.76) 
3.70 (20.23) 
0.79 
130 
-2.39 (-16.05) 
3.91 (15.11) 
0.66 
131 
-2.29 
Notes: Commodity sectors in the rows are listed in the descending order (in magnitude) of the simple 
average. 
 The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on the basis of the United Nations’ trade statistics, UNCOMTRADE. 
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Table 4. East Asian economies’ average ranking in the world in terms of trade volume (measured in US dollars), 1985, 1995 and 
2003 
(ranking) 
Commodity 
sector 
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand China Hong 
Kong, 
China 
Japan Korea Simple 
average 
Electrical 1985 38 15 31 9 28 33 8 1 10 19.2 
 1995 28 7 25 4 16 12 7 1 5 11.7 
 2003 28 11 15 7 16 4 5 2 6 10.4 
Machinery 1985 39 29 49 14 31 37 12 2 22 26.1 
 1995 30 17 38 6 19 14 10 1 13 16.4  
 2003 32 16 24 10 20 4 8 3 11 14.2  
Transportation 1985 65 27 43 22 44 29 23 1 8 29.1  
 1995 37 23 44 20 28 15 22 1 10 22.2  
 2003 43 42 36 30 21 12 32 2 9 25.2  
Pottery 1985 39 35 42 30 19 28 14 5 16 25.3  
 1995 35 26 46 23 15 10 12 7 24 22.0  
 2003 26 29 47 32 15 8 12 10 25 22.7  
Metal 1985 31 25 39 26 36 41 22 2 12 26.0  
 1995 33 29 48 22 36 9 13 2 11 22.6  
 2003 36 29 53 30 33 4 17 2 11 23.9  
Chemical 1985 25 20 44 13 30 26 21 6 19 22.7  
 1995 25 22 53 16 19 13 11 4 12 19.4  
 2003 25 22 57 15 18 11 17 6 14 20.6  
Wood and Paper 1985 12 7 25 20 35 33 24 14 27 21.9  
 1995 7 12 43 29 32 19 15 1 27 20.6  
 2003 10 18 51 39 28 11 21 20 25 24.8  
Others 1985 43 31 29 18 25 28 6 3 12 21.7  
 1995 24 23 30 17 15 4 2 8 10 14.8  
 2003 29 24 36 14 20 2 3 8 13 16.6  
Mining 1985 6 16 51 14 56 12 47 33 31 29.6  
1995 9 18 55 15 51 16 28 23 26 26.8  
2003 12 19 60 17 42 16 57 34 24 31.2  
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Table 4. East Asian economies’ average ranking in the world in terms of trade volume (measured in US dollars), 1985, 1995 and 
2003 (Continued) 
(ranking) 
Commodity 
sector 
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand China Hong 
Kong, 
China 
Japan Korea Simple 
average 
Light 1985 41 44 35 24 30 23 9 15 5 25.1  
 1995 13 24 36 34 9 3 2 25 8 17.1  
 2003 17 25 37 41 19 1 3 30 23 21.8  
Food 1985 38 41 22 29 15 27 12 18 21 24.8  
 1995 41 30 49 14 15 12 10 20 26 24.1  
 2003 37 28 44 18 17 13 20 26 23 25.1  
Textiles 1985 29 33 38 17 16 1 44 11 55 27.1  
 1995 68 21 19 2 6 38 34 11 26 25.0  
 2003 75 3 55 7 53 27 56 18 28 35.8  
Agriculture 1985 21 17 30 22 15 13 31 26 28 22.6  
 1995 21 16 32 27 14 9 26 41 28 23.8  
 2003 20 16 35 40 14 7 36 42 38 27.6  
Notes:  Commodity sectors in the rows are listed in the same order as in Table 3. 
 Comparable ranking for 1976 is not available due to a much small number of countries listed in the trade database than for the other years. 
Source: As for Table 3.
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4.2 Creation and utilization of industrial knowledge: a focus on East Asia 
Within the whole spectrum of export commodities, what could be called 
“knowledge-intensive products” have been increasing rapidly in East Asian economies 
(Table 5). That the “knowledge” component of those knowledge-intensive products 
comprises the major source of economic rents is a well-known proposition (Schumpeter, 
1961). It is then imperative for a developing economy to capture ever-progressing 
industrial technology through streamlining its domestic productive capacity. Since, as is 
often the case, developing economies lack the very capacity to do so, they oftentimes 
rely on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) from developed economies including 
the EU, the US and Japan.  As long as those developing economies can effectively 
capture knowledge, they acquire economic rents. FDI here can be viewed as a transfer 
of money and the channel of acquiring knowledge. 
  As Table 5 suggests, both European and East Asian economies have 
increasingly been dependent on inward FDI as the source of capital stock formation. It 
is generally observed that smaller economies in terms of GDP, most notably Hong Kong 
and Singapore in Asia, and Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden in Europe, record a 
larger ratio of FDI to capital stock. A major difference between East Asia and Europe 
may lie in the casual observation that whereas European economies have been serving 
as donors and recipients of FDI simultaneously, most developing East Asian economies 
have simply been hosting, as genuine recipients, those FDI projects undertaken by the 
region’s developed economies (viz., Japan and Korea) serving as donors. Put differently, 
the increasingly higher share of knowledge-intensive products (as shown in Table 5) 
reflects this concentration of FDI in those East Asian economies (as shown in Table 6). 
In sum, with respect to the ”midstream” part of the entire economic value-creating 
process of goods production, East Asia has been dependent on foreign manufacturing 
capacity. 
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Table 5. Trade matrix of knowledge-intensive goods 
    （US$ million） 
To 
From 
ASEAN 
Fiveb China 
Hong 
Kong Korea Japan USA ＥＵ12c World Totala 
ASEAN Fiveb     
1990 4,946d 317 1,505 851 2,107 11,373 5,276 32,598 
1995 21,965 1,247 7,442 2,631 10,975 29,784 14,197 109,297 
2000 35,023 4,554 10,417 5,655 16,502 40,252 27,220 161,500 
China     
1990 77 － 1,094 3 55 101 152 1,734 
1995 1,216 － 4,362 373 2,346 3,075 2,125 16,431 
2000 3,478 － 9,251 1,520 5,294 11,529 8,610 45,370 
Hong Kong     
1990 186 889 － 43 66 533 495 2,581 
1995 1,066 2,036 － 112 335 1,179 604 6,200 
2000 775 1,789 － 68 205 982 1,818 5,436 
Korea     
1990 1,430 n.a. 892 － 2,011 5,210 2,245 15,357 
1995 5,771 1,608 2,797 － 4,287 11,202 4,024 36,908 
2000 7,986 3,633 3,766 － 5,591 15,268 7,966 54,513 
Japan     
1990 7,589 1,563 4,047 4,283 － 25,064 15,862 74,415 
1995 22,280 4,307 8,868 8,709 － 38,355 18,981 122,602 
2000 22,819 7,532 10,044 9,992 － 44,485 26,992 122,566 
USA     
1990 8,605 1,457 2,046 3,704 11,787 － 25,886 104,797 
1995 17,451 3,268 4,722 8,083 16,324 － 29,126 151,334 
2000 24,195 5,758 5,173 12,504 20,821 － 62,469 199,983 
EU12c     
1990 2,927 254 203 1,314 3,021 10,994 n.a. n.a. 
1995 9,266 4,028 3,570 2,489 5,479 18,321 n.a. n.a. 
2000 11,782 5,402 4,532 4,315 8,188 49,853 221,631 439,972 
World Totala     
1990 30,583 2,513 4,251 12,477 23,472 86,321 n.a. n.a. 
1995 95,682 32,468 42,744 26,752 52,240 168,171 n.a. n.a. 
2000 120,721 55,046 56,100 38,244 61,805 238,778 n.a. 1,218,827 
Notes: See Annex IV-A (pp.87-88) of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) [1994] “The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities using Patent 
Data as Science and Technology Indicators, Patent Manual 1994”, Paris: OECD 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/62/2095942.pdf, accessed on 28 September 2005) for the trade 
classification codes of “knowledge-intensive products”. 
a Total of exports by economies listed in PC-TAS. 
b ASEAN Five refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
c EU12 refers to Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
d The Philippines’ data is not included. 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of United Nations Trade Database PC-TAS. 
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Table 6. Inward FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product, by region and economy, 
1980-2003 
(Percent) 
Economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2003 
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 2.1
Asia (excl. Japan) 17.9 20.9 17.9 19.1 30.3
Indonesia 13.2 28.2 34.0 25.0 27.5
Malaysia 20.7 23.3 23.4 32.3 57.2
Philippines 3.9 8.5 7.4 8.2 14.5
Singapore 52.9 73.6 83.1 78.7 161.3
Thailand 3.0 5.1 9.6 10.4 25.8
Cambodia 2.4 2.0 3.4 12.1 46.4
Laos 0.3 - 1.5 11.6 30.1
Myanmar .. .. .. 6.1 ..
Vietnam 0.2 1.1 4.0 28.5 50.6
China 3.1 3.4 7.0 19.6 35.6
Hong Kong 623.8 525.5 269.6 163.4 236.5
Taiwan 5.8 4.7 6.1 5.9 11.9
Korea 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.9 7.8
India 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.6 5.4
Bangladesh 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 5.0
Sri Lanka 5.7 8.6 8.5 10.0 15.6
Pakistan 2.9 3.5 4.8 9.1 10.7
Nepal 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 2.5
Western Europe 6.2 9.3 11.0 13.3 33.0 
  Austria 4.0 5.6 6.1 7.4 23.7
  Belgium and Luxembourg 5.8 21.2 27.8 38.3 -
  Denmark 6.1 6.0 6.9 13.2 36.1
  Finland 1.0 2.5 3.8 6.5 28.6
  France 3.8 6.9 7.1 12.3 24.7
  Germany 3.9 5.1 7.1 7.8 22.6
  Greece 9.3 20.2 6.7 9.3 9.8
  Ireland 149.9 157.7 71.5 60.2 129.7
  Italy 2.0 4.5 5.3 5.8 11.8
  Netherlands 10.8 18.8 23.3 28.0 65.6
  Portugal 12.3 18.7 14.8 17.1 36.3
  Spain 2.3 5.2 12.8 18.7 27.4
  Sweden 2.2 4.2 5.3 12.5 47.5
  United Kingdom 11.8 14.1 20.6 17.6 37.4
Central and Eastern Europe - 0.2 1.3 5.4 23.7
West Asia .. 0.2 1.3 5.3 9.2
Pacific 22.5 24.8 29.2 27.1 40.6
Africa 8.2 9.9 10.8 15.6 25.3
Latin America, Caribbean  6.5 11.0 10.4 11.8 36.8
North America 4.5 5.5 8.0 8.3 15.4
USA 3.0 4.4 6.9 7.3 14.1
World total 6.7 8.4 9.3 10.3 22.9
Notes: .. Negligible  - Not available.  
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, various years. 
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There is yet another nexus to knowledge-intensive international trade in the 
further “upstream” part of the whole economic process: knowledge creation itself. One 
aspect of this knowledge creation is reflected in intellectual property right figures, e.g., 
patent counts and royalty receipts and payments. In terms of patent counts shown in 
Table 7, most Asian economies listed (with the exception of Japan, and Korea to some 
extent) have smaller numbers of patent counts as knowledge creation than European 
economies, and those small numbers of patent counts are dominated by non-residents. 
A close look at the Table might reveal ambivalent observations. On the positive 
side, as shown in the Table, most East Asian economies are increasing their number of 
local patent applications. Indeed, the numbers of patents filed by ASEAN economies in 
recent years exceed that for Korea in 1980. Yet on the negative side, again, their local 
patent markets remain both small relative to the U.S. as well as European economies, 
and dominated by foreign applications. Overall, it seems East Asian economies’ 
knowledge creation has been disproportionately low vis-à-vis its midstream 
(production) and downstream (export) sizes. 
Reflecting the small size of the patent application but disproportionately large 
demand for production technology, royalty receipts and payments, as in Table 8, register 
deficit (excess payments) for all the East Asian economies listed (including Japan). A 
more detailed observation, though, reveals that Korea has been an active “imitator”, 
with as four times more payment counts than China, in 2002. The US, France and the 
United Kingdom, in contrast, serve as net donors of the knowledge, as the sheer volume 
of the royalty receipts in these economies suggests.  
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Table 7. Patent filed by East Asian and other economies, 1980-2001 
(number) 
Economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2001 
East Asian 
economy 
Indonesia - - - - 42,503(0)
77,407
(0)
Malaysia 282 1,080 - 4,052(141)
6,451
(179)
-
(-)
Philippines 904 1,551 1,256 97 3,361(144)
13,598
(0)
Singapore - 1,257 880 11,881(10) 
51,495
(374)
79,026
(0)
Thailand - - - - 5,071(477)
5,665
(1,117)
Vietnam - 9 29 16,982(23)
42,212
(37)
76,542
(0)
Korea 4,041 5,339 20,595 96,557 (59,249)
133,127
(56,214)
190,022
(74,001)
China - 417 28,176 41,773(10,066) 
52,348
(146)
149,294
(30,324)
Hong Kong 713 958 1,093 1,961(23) 
6,040
(42)
8,914
(74)
Taiwan - - - - 31,115 -
Japan 408,101 501,819 303,960 388,957(335,061) 
442,245
(361,094)
496,621
(388,390)
Other 
economies 
India 1,020 1,962 2,129 6,566(1,545) 
38,362
(14)
78,522
(234)
USA 62,280 72,238 91,245 235,440(127,476) 
294,706
(138313)
375,657
(190,907)
United 
Kingdom - - 12,699 
115,754
(25,355) 
192,875
(31,326)
264,706
(34,500)
Germany 59,179 67,666 69,943 136,615(51,948)
220,761
(74,232)
292,398
(80,222)
France 30,349 18,554 15,430 89,766(16,140)
138,455
(20,998)
175,122
(21,790)
Italy 7,953 47,793 14,824 64,955(1,625)
128,260
(9,613)
156,858
(3,819)
Note: Figures in parentheses for 1995, 1999 and 2000 denote the number of patent applications filed 
by residents. 
- not available. 
Sources: The European Patent Office database (http://ep.espacenet.com/) for 1990; World Bank 
(2002) for 1995 and 1999; World Bank (2004) for 2001. 
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Table 8. Royalty receipts and payments for selected economies a 
（US$ million） 
Economy 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 
Korea 23 122 
3
323
37
1,364
299
2,384
688 
3,221 
826 
2,979 
China n.a. n.a. 
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
80.4 
1,281 
196 
491 
Taiwan n.a. n.a. 
2
150
121
582
241
937
371 
1,834 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Malaysia n.a. 37 
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
18 
546 
12 
628 
Philippines n.a. 19 
n.a.
17
1
38
2
99
7 
197 
1 
230 
Thailand n.a. 30 
0.04
46
n.a.
170
0.6
630
8.7 
710 
7 
1,104 
Japan 350 1,330 
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
6,005
9,417
10,227 
11,007 
10,422 
11,021 
US 7,080 730 
6,680
1,170
16,640
3,140
30,290
6,930
38,030 
16,100 
44,142 
19,258 
United 
Kingdom 
1,135 
925 
1,162
807
3,055
3,575
6,080
5,198
7,538 
6,503 
7,701 
5,993 
France 496 1,028 
522
982
1,295
1,629
1,850
2,320
2,310 
2,051 
3,241 
1,956 
Germany 608 1,449 
617
1,216
1,987
3,797
3,134
5,917
2,821 
5,454 
3,765 
5,064 
Italy 96 450 
64
332
1,040
1,959
462
1,166
563 
1,198 
539 
1,273 
Note: aUpper figures denote receipts, and lower figures, payments. 
Source: International Trade and Investment Center (Japan) (2002); World Bank (2004). 
 
Considering that even economically advanced Japan and Germany still remain net 
importers of knowledge in terms of the balance of royalty receipts and payments (as 
shown in Table 8), however, royalty payment is not a “bad option” for the country’s 
economic development. After all, economical or efficient capturing of industrial 
knowledge pays off, be the knowledge generated inside or outside of the region. All told, 
most East Asian countries have not been creators of but recipients of “knowledge”. 
Those East Asian economies’ strategy was one of “catching up”, i.e., they have been 
preoccupied largely with transforming themselves away from less lucrative commodity 
sectors including textiles and agricultural products towards more profitable, or 
rent-capturing sectors, represented most notably by the electrical/electronics and 
machinery sectors.6 
 
 
                                                  
6 Malaysia’s almost exclusive dependence on FDI in the electrical/electronics sector is a typical case 
in point (see, e.g., Hobday, 1999; Brooks and Hill, 2004). 
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5. Conclusions and prospects for future research 
The knowledge-creation aspect of economic activity can be viewed as “dynamic” as 
opposed to “static” within the standard framework of trade analysis. While the 
importance of the former has long been recognized, however, theoretical sophistication 
has tended to focus on the latter. This paper has studied technological innovation with 
an emphasis on its “dynamic” evolutionary property: technological breakthrough takes 
place discontinuously yet on the basis of existing industrial operation. The important 
feature of this modeling is that once innovation has been made, it becomes more 
probable for the innovative producer to make further innovation. From this view, 
“innovating by doing” might be an appropriate characterization. 
Theoretical part of this study has argued that those industrial fields with either 
rapid rate of innovation or difficult technological absorption exhibit the 
“winner-take-all” property, i.e., a large-scale exporter with state-of-the-art capital stock 
would build further upon its existing productive facility and facilitate the next round of 
innovative industrial operation, resulting in a larger export share than in the case of 
mature or standardized industrial sectors with little scope for further technological 
upgrading. With this in mind, the theoretical part of this paper has demonstrated 
conceptualization of knowledge-creation, or innovation, in conjunction with an 
evolutionary model of export-competition. 
Empirical part of this study has first identified the stronger “winner-take-all” 
property for apparently more technology-intensive export commodities, exemplified 
most by the electronics and machinery products. The paper has next made an overview 
of East Asia’s performance in terms of knowledge-utilization (rather than internal 
knowledge creation) and discussed that the region has basically been capturing the fruit 
of innovation from outside the region, through the conduct of attracting foreign direct 
investment undertaken by multinational firms. In spite of the region’s status as a net 
importer of technology in the “upstream” part of the economic process, its export 
performance as the most “downstream” part of the economic process in general has 
been illuminating, especially in the said technology-intensive sectors. 
As argued above, East Asia’s economic dynamism is brought about by 
capturing innovation through direct royalty payment and foreign direct investment as 
indirect technology transfer: In essence, the region’s economies have largely been 
“borrowing” from winners rather than “stealing” from them. East Asia has made an 
increasing resort to technology-intensive commodity sectors, the process of which has 
presumably been enabled through purchasing licensing and attracting 
technology-bearing inward foreign direct investment. What could be the welfare 
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implication of the cycle of innovation and imitation? 
Existing literature studying the impact of IPRs protection on the rate of 
technological development 7  points out that a large demand difference between 
developed “North” and developing “South” could serve as deterrent against potential 
IPR infringement, since such conducts in the developing South would discourage 
innovators in the North from incurring R&D costs for fear of potential free-riding by the 
South. In other words, a high level of IPR protection and observance in the South would 
encourage innovation in the North. On the other hand, an enhanced level of IPR 
protection is said to suppress economic growth in the South due to expensive imitation 
costs (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
Under the circumstance of what could be termed “non-strategic” R&D 
investment, i.e., the investment being made anyway irrespective of the rival’s behavior 
(the innovator’s behavior for the imitator and vice versa), an increased pace of 
innovation and imitation between North and South (as a result of East Asian economic 
integration involving both developed and developing economies, for example) could 
accelerate the pace of “globalization cycle” (which is discussed in the former part of this 
paper). Considering the overall gains from innovation, therefore, acceleration of the full 
cycle of innovation and imitation might be a desirable option. 
 Prospects for future study would be as follows: Regarding innovation in its 
generic form, the importance of “heterogeneity” should be emphasized more in the 
theoretical formulation of innovation 8 : given the neoclassical treatment of 
“representative” (hence identical) firms, there seems to be little scope for depicting 
really “endogenous” innovation process except for an ad-hoc assignment of increased 
values to “total factor productivity”. The model used in the present study is not free 
from this criticism. As for prospects for future research, therefore, dynamic gains from 
interaction among heterogeneous agents would seem to shed more light on the 
contentious arguments of whether or not “winner-take-all” innovation process is 
welfare-enhancing for the global society as a “monolith” or a coherent economic entity. 
In essence, non-strategic or “single-minded” engineering effort in pursuit of further 
innovation would in principle be desirable for the whole society. 
 
 
 
                                                  
7 See, for instance, Diwan and Rodrik (1991). 
8 Aoki (1996, 2001) constructs models of innovation and imitation among heterogeneous agents. 
This approach could be introduced in the theoretical formulation of international trade and 
investment with innovation arising from heterogeneity.. 
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Appendix: Definition of commodity sectors in terms of Standard International Trade 
Classification Revision 3 (SITC-R3) 
Commodity sector 2 digit code of SITC-R3  
Agricultural products 00-05, 07, 08, 22, 29, 41-43 
Food and beverages 06, 09, 11, 12 
Mining products 27, 28, 32-35 
Chemicals  23, 51-59, 62 
Light industry products 21, 61, 81-83, 85 
Wood and paper  24, 25, 63, 64 
Textiles  26, 65, 84 
Pottery products  66 
Basic metals  67-69 
General and precision machinery 72-75, 87, 88 
Electrical machinery  71, 76, 77 
Transportation machinery  78, 79 
Others  89, 96, 97 
Source: Fukao, Ishido and Ito (2003). 
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